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Preface to this Special Issue on Free Will and Epistemology by 
Robert Lockie (University of West London) 
 
Let me begin by recording my gratitude to the editors of, and contributors 
to, this special issue. This volume follows on from two wonderful 
conferences on my 2018 monograph Free Will and Epistemology – one 
held in Budapest, one in London1. I wish to express my appreciation to all 
who contributed to these events, and to the institutions which hosted them 
– in particular, albeit with a heavy heart, the Central European University: 
subsequently all but driven out of Budapest by the calculatingly malicious 
actions of the present government of Hungary. As regards individuals, two 
of the editors of this volume (András Szigeti and László Bernáth) 
organised the former conference, whilst Tim O’Connor’s paper grew out 
of his contribution to the latter. My deep and sincere appreciation to all. 
 
Because of the compressed deadline for this preface, I have, at the point of 
writing, only had access to the abstracts of these papers, and, beyond 
recording my gratitude to the authors, must therefore largely refrain from 
introducing them further – I shall be reading them with great care 
subsequently and hope to respond to them in later work. Some of the papers 
 
1 My thanks to the Central European University (Budapest); The Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences (MTA); the Lund Gothenburg Responsibility Project; the Institute of Philosophy 
at the School of Advanced Study (University of London); the Mind Association; the 
Aristotelian Society; the University of West London; and especially to András Szigeti, 
László Bernáth and Tim O’Connor. 
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found herein are more addressed to the specific arguments found in my 
monograph, while others are more concerned with the titular issues shared 
by that book and this special issue. I wish here to situate these papers within 
the framework of this topic area as a whole – to motivate this area (free 
will and epistemology) as one of great and enduring importance to 
philosophy – and, if I may be permitted, of flagging a few of my own 
contributions in doing so. 
 
 
Normative Epistemology and Free Will 
  
There are numbers of recent works in the areas of free will or epistemology 
considered separately – both are of course currently flourishing research 
areas. Piecemeal connections between these two areas are widely 
acknowledged, and debates surrounding these issues are widely joined 
with regard to a number of distinct topics (e.g. engagement with the 
‘doxastic voluntarism’ debates, the ‘epistemic deontologism’ debates, the 
‘reasons-responsiveness’ debates, the ‘does reflection presuppose open 
choice’ debates). However, relatively little recent work exists which is at 
once an uncompromising contribution to both fields – work that is squarely 
situated within both sub-disciplines, as opposed to being situated in one 
sub-discipline and borrowing from, or making excursus to, the other. In 
particular very little book-length work exists which does this. I have argued 
that a historically and currently important position in normative 
epistemology (deontic internalism) has critical conceptual connections 
with an important position in the free will debates (libertarianism). Bluntly: 
that to be epistemically justified one must have freedom of thought – where 
this latter involves a strong notion of freedom, and the former involves a 
normative authority that is essential for reflexive epistemic justification. 
The work therefore requires participants in the free will / responsibility 
debates to effect serious engagement with epistemology – and vice versa. 
I am grateful to the editors of, and contributors to, this special edition for 
doing just that. 
 
 
The Transcendental Arguments 
 
One of the great metaphilosophical traditions is that of transcendental 
argument (peritrope, ‘self-undermining’ argument). Like all metaphilosophical 
traditions, this one is controversial. My book defends two, connected, 
transcendental arguments: one for a deontic conception of epistemic 
internalism (Part One) and the other for a strong notion of free will (Part 
Two) – with the latter argument relying in part upon the former. The latter 
is one of the great, famous, philosophical arguments – from Epicurus to 
Free Will and Epistemology 
 7 
Kant to Popper. The second part of the book is an extended defence of this 
argument. In this special issue both Nadine Elzein and Toumas Pernu’s co-
authored paper and Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette’s paper assess 
instances of these transcendental arguments for free will – including my 
version – while Amit Pundik’s paper argues that the transcendentally 
established notion of free will is so strong metaphysically that it implies 
the unpredictability of free actions.  
 
The book argues that many determinist and some indeterminist accounts 
of free will are indefensible on the ground that they must withhold from 
their proponents the reflexive epistemic justification that these accounts 
themselves require. It likewise argues that certain epistemic views 
(radically externalist views – views constituting a ‘totalising’ externalism) 
are indefensible on the ground that they withhold from their proponents the 
reflexive epistemic justification needed to maintain these epistemic 
positions. The book recommends from this that we develop accounts in 
these areas that are reflexively defensible, and advances an account of 
epistemic justification (‘thin deontological internalism’) and an account of 
free will (self-determinism) which are just that. Relatedly, in this 
contribution, Luca Zanetti’s paper investigates in detail whether this 
transcendental argument against externalism is successful after all. 
Andrew James Lantham and Timothy O’Connor map other novel ways to 
establish epistemic justification for believing in free will. Lantham argues 
that the careful analysis of the concept of free will will do the work; while 
O’Connor claims that one should consider the belief in free will as a belief 
that is justified a priori. 
 
 
The “Thin Deontological” Account of Epistemic Justification 
 
Part One of my book defends a currently rather unfashionable account of 
epistemic justification, one which was of extraordinary historical 
importance but has now partly fallen into desuetude. This strongly deontic 
notion of internalism was engaged with by Plantinga, Foley and Alston; 
and, going back further than these figures, has its roots in Clifford, 
Descartes, Locke, and much of the early-modern epistemological 
enlightenment. In this work, this is baptised as a ‘thin deontological’ notion 
of internalism, though Alston (1985) from the standpoint of a (guarded, 
partial) opponent, abbreviated this notion as ‘Jdi’ – which stands for 
deontic, internalist, justification. Plantinga just calls this same notion 
‘internalism’, but when pushed, classical deontological internalism – and 
deprecates those pure accessibilist internalists who depart from what he 
(an externalist) nevertheless identifies as its “deep integrity” (Plantinga 
1993, 28). A version of this conception of epistemic justification has 
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become known as ‘Foley Rationality’ (cf. e.g. Foley 1993), while 
Bergmann (2006) entitles it ‘subjective deontological justification’ or 
‘epistemic blamelessness’. Other major figures (Chisholm, BonJour, 
Goldman) played major roles engaging with this notion throughout the 
1980’s. Although epistemic deontology per se is currently quite well 
represented in recent epistemology, its defenders tend to be insufficiently 
rooted in the ethical literature, and tend to fail to follow through the ‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’ ethics of belief entailments of said view to their logical, 
perspectival, conclusions. They also tend to be insufficiently 
‘metaphilosophical’ in their epistemological purview – and thereby 
insufficiently reflexive in their practice. It is regrettable that this highly 
motivated and carefully thought-through variant of epistemic deontology 
per se, with its deep historical provenance and elegant connections with 
the ethical literature, appears to have been substantially marginalised or 
eclipsed; and (apart from Foley’s ongoing work) has rather wanted for 
recent defences. I defend and deploy this subjective, perspectival, 
deontically internalist notion of epistemic justification – adverting as it 
does to a deep, neo-Cartesian ‘ethics of belief’ tradition – whereby 
justification is taken to involve the discharge of one’s epistemic 
responsibilities, as dutiful thought, as reasoning as one ought.  
 
 
Resisting Transcendental Arguments 
 
One of the first points to make – or rather concede – is that, at a superficial 
level, it is very easy to resist transcendental arguments of the kind I 
advance in my work. For instance, if one wishes to claim (as I do) that we 
cannot be justified in abandoning deontic epistemic internalism because 
the ‘last ought’ is the ought which urges us to abandon all oughts – or, 
more prosaically, that one cannot abandon an oughts-based epistemology 
tout court, since one would have to claim that one ought thus to abandon 
said epistemology – the obvious response would be to contend that this is 
question-begging. One merely embraces an alternative, non-oughts-based 
notion of justification and uses this to effect the abandonment. Were the 
counter really that obvious, why advance such a transcendental argument 
at all?  
 
However, in the face of such ‘question-begging’ objections, a number of 
issues arise. One question is whether there is such a notion as that to which 
these objections make appeal: that is, a notion genuinely of justification 
(‘our concept’, justification itself, the Echt notion thereof, and not some 
other, more-or-less Ersatz, more-or-less revisionary thing). Is this 
justificatory notion radically (wholly, at every level, without remainder or 
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concealed indebtedness) non-deontic?2 May we take one such purely non-
deontic yet genuinely justificatory notion ‘off the shelf’, as it were? Has 
the proponent of this ‘question-begging’ counter appreciated deeply 
enough that it is wholesale (‘totalising’) replacement that needs defending 
here? Of course, there are non-deontic notions in epistemology – I defend 
and employ such notions in my book. Of course, they are of great 
importance in epistemology. But they function in an epistemology in 
which they are seen as not the only normative kinds. The question is 
whether we can be reflexively justified given the wholesale, totalising 
abandonment of any notion of epistemic ‘ought’ – or, put another way, 
whether we can avail ourselves of these other notions (of truth, reliability, 
access, mentalism, ‘objective’ rationality, etc.) to do all the work our 
former notions did, without at any point needing to make appeal to 
reasoning as we ought. That is, (as for the case for Meno road-to-Larissa 
cases of truth simpliciter) without merely ceasing to do epistemology – or 
at least, the epistemology of epistemology, epistemology where this 
concerns terminus issues of justification and not some other thing. Where 
do we repair to if we thus abandon said (deontic) notion of justification 
tout court? That is, reflexively, at every level, how do we effect the tasks 
which formerly were effected by this deontic notion – now, supposedly, to 
be replaced?  
 
As an example of how dismissive such ‘question-begging’ counters can 
be, consider the attempt to respond to a transcendental argument in a 
different area (eliminativism) by Paul Churchland (I responded to, and 
quoted this passage, in Lockie 2003). Having urged that we abandon no 
less than beliefs, desires, consciousness, truth, reference, rationality, 
sentences, logic, language, Churchland responds to peritrope objections 
(e.g. from Lynne Rudder Baker, that this would constitute an act of 
‘cognitive suicide’) in the following terms:  
 
Let us concede then, or even insist, that current [folk 
psychology] permits no tension-free denial of itself within its 
own theoretical vocabulary. [...] [A] new psychological 
framework [...] need have no such limitation [...] we need only 
construct it, and move in. We can then express criticisms [...] 
that are entirely free of internal conflicts. This was the aim of 
[eliminativism] in the first place. (Churchland 1993, 214). 
 
“We need only construct it, and move in” – well, that’s rather breezy is it 
not?  Did we really “construct” our previous framework? And is our new 
 
2 Or is it, rather, putatively ‘deontic’ yet seen as devoid of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ entailments 
which had hitherto appeared internal to the concept of deontology itself and as such? 
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home available to order as a development, “off plan”, as it were? Can we 
live in these (envisioned, advertised) new premises – are they habitable, 
for creatures like us? What are their specifications? Will our new dwelling 
offer us all the qualities of our previous living space? Presumably not – 
that was the point of the replacement, was it not? But then, is there an 
overarching perspective affording a view which permits of normative 
comparison between the properties of our former (actual, extant) normative 
framework and some envisaged, not-yet-in-existence Philosophie der 
Zukunft? Problems both of incommensurability and an inherent tension 
between “view from nowhere” and “there is no view from nowhere” 
commitments ineluctably bedevil any such philosophy of wholesale vast 
normative replacement: problems that do not suggest such a blasé response 
would be by any means easy to defend. 
 
Eliminations of great normative frameworks require a great deal more than 
simply pointing to an existing framework and saying, as it were, from 
outside of it, or sideways on to it: “I have decided to abandon that!” Serious 
philosophical and metaphilosophical work is needed to establish whether 
any such abandonment is possible, or even conceivable, much less feasible; 
and what would follow were this so – which of our practices could be 
preserved, which would need revision (and to what extent) and which 
would have to be abandoned. Serious work would also be needed to 
consider the knock-on, holistic chasing-through of the unintended and 
unforeseen consequences of said revisions and abandonments. The avowed 
presence of existing piecemeal alternatives to a given normative 
philosophical account (e.g. epistemic externalism vis à vis deontic 
internalism) given that one is not seeking a wholesale, ‘totalising’ 
elimination, with inevitable commitments at the reflexive, metaphilosophical 
level, does not establish the viability of said wholesale, totalising, 
elimination. This is a point well appreciated in the Lucretian continuation 
of the Epicurean tradition of peritrope argumentation within epistemology: 
one may claim one can doubt any one thing without thereby establishing 
one can doubt everything (Lucretius 1947, Bk 4, 469–521). 
 
In my monograph I pushed back against this sweeping “replace the 
framework since it is question-begging” response throughout, but 
especially, and in great detail, in Chapters 5, 7, and 10. In Chapter 5 I 
quoted Goldman (1967) in his paper famously advancing the very first 
modern externalism (the causal theory of knowledge) as someone whom I 
may nevertheless read as tacitly supportive of my position rather than, say, 
his more-radical erstwhile philosophical ally, Hilary Kornblith. The last 
sentence of that famous paper is where Goldman precisely notes that his 
new externalist epistemology offers us a less-than-totalising, less-than-
eliminativist world-view – an epistemology that is irreflexive: 
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I think my analysis shows that the question of whether 
someone knows a certain proposition is, in part, a causal 
question, although, of course, the question of what the correct 
analysis is of ‘S knows that p’ is not a causal question 
(Goldman 1967, 372). 
 
Of course? An irreflexive theory cannot be reflexively incoherent of 
course, but if an implicit awareness of the threat of this kind of peritrope 
was not behind the otherwise stipulative limit early Goldman placed on his 
theory one is left wondering what was. What Goldman, I suggest, realised, 
was that to generalise from a piecemeal alternative theory of knowledge to 
an entire, overarching normative epistemic framework (including 
justification, rationality, the reflexive status of the philosopher advancing 
and evaluating said theory…) needs a lot more philosophical and 
metaphilosophical work than is gestured towards or acknowledged by 
“only construct it, and move in”. 
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